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ABSTRACT 
Do the countries which grow share the same features as those which decline? 
How can some countries achieve such long-term sustainable growth while others fail so 
badly? This paper builds on the emerging literature on growth asymmetries by examining 
movement across income categories in the World Development Reports over a significant 
period of time. The results confirm the existence of asymmetries and find that the factors 
which are correlated with movement upwards or downwards are markedly different. 
Evidence is presented which suggests that growth episodes share some common features 
while economic collapse may occur for a broader range of reasons.  
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 MOVING UP AND MOVING DOWN:  A NEW WAY OF 
EXAMINING COUNTRY GROWTH DYNAMICS 
 





Despite numerous development policies and programs, relatively few countries 
have changed income categories over the past several decades. While a small number of 
countries, like the Asian Tigers, became examples of outstanding success, many more 
countries, notably Sub-Saharan African countries, have declined or stagnated. Why are 
some countries able to achieve sustainable growth while others fail so badly?  
An emerging body of literature argues that the answer lies in growth asymmetries. 
(Hausman  et al. 2005; Jones and Olken, 2005a; Jerzmanowski, forthcoming)  This 
contrasts with the large body of literature examining growth correlates which assumes 
that all countries lie on the same contour (inter alia Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 
1992; King and Levine, 1993; Sala-i-Martin, 1997).  Therefore, variables are assumed to 
have the same impact on all the countries no matter the stage of development and 
regardless of the direction of movement. By looking at growth episodes, the new work 
finds both that growth accelerations and decelerations have different determinants and 
that there are asymmetries between growth accelerations and collapses.  
In general, however, these growth episodes have been defined on a window of 
several years in a rather ad hoc way. This paper builds on the emerging literature on 
growth asymmetries by examining movement across income categories in the World 
Development Reports (WDR) over a longer period of time. In particular, we investigate 
the correlates with changes in membership between different income categories from 
1981 to 2002. These changes capture both the successful stories of sustainable growth 
and the declines in wealth over a rather long period. The use of these pre-determined 
                                                 
1 Marc Rockmore is a Research Analyst and Xiaobo Zhang is a Senior Research Fellow at IFPRI’s 
Development Strategy and Governance Division.   10
categories allows us to avoid some of the arbitrariness in defining growth episodes such 
as in Hausman et al. (2005).  
Based upon a literature review of the growth empirics, variables for geography, 
institutions, trade, conflict, and the initial stage of development are used in the analysis. 
A logistic model is employed to estimate the correlates of moving up and moving down 
with a rather good fit. By estimating separate models for movement in either direction, 
different variables can emerge as correlates for movement upwards or downwards.
2  The 
results confirm the existence of asymmetries in the growth process. We find that factors 
which are correlated with movement upwards or downwards are markedly different. The 
model also better predicts movement upwards. Our framework suggests that this may be 
because growth episodes share some common features while economic collapse may 
occur for a wide range of reasons (“the weakest link”). 
While not significant in all of the robustness check, one exception to the 
asymmetry may be the average ratio of trade to GDP which is generally significantly 
positive in both directions. This is likely due to the volatility associated with increased 
trade and the ability of countries to cope with shocks. While integration with the world 
market brings about tremendous opportunities and potential for growth, it may also 
exposes the domestic economy to global shocks. For countries which rely on natural 
resources or other primary goods as the major exports, the volatility of raw material 
prices in the international market may translate into growth volatility. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the growth 
literature and presents the framework and the hypotheses underlying the paper. Data is 
described in Section III. Section IV presents the results while section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 This differs from more traditional cross-country regressions which assume that the same variables effect 
movement in either direction and that this effect is constant regardless of the direction of movement.   11
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW, FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
There exists an extensive literature which seeks to explain why certain countries 
develop while others stagnate or decline. This literature has proposed a wide variety of 
factors (and associated variables) without necessarily agreeing on any broad set of causes 
or proxies.  Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that “accumulation and technological change [the 
traditional focus of growth theory] are at best proximate causes of economic growth… 
[which in turn raises the question]: why did some societies manage to accumulate and 
innovate more rapidly than other?” The authors offer three broad answers: geography, 
integration and institutions (“deep” determinants of economic growth in their 
terminology). 
The first type of answer emphasizes the role of geography in explaining both 
historical and current differences in growth between developed and developing countries. 
These explanations generally seek to explain the persisting low levels of development in 
Africa. Gallup et al. (1999) and Bloom and Sachs (1998) argue that geographic factors 
have been historically underappreciated by economists. For instance, tropical countries 
tend to be disadvantaged with regards to agricultural productivity due to the length of 
growing seasons, sunlight, and other factors (Bloom and Sachs, 1998). Technological 
advances in agriculture historically do not transfer well across ecological zones thereby 
creating a divide across the North-South axis (Diamond, 1997). Additionally, tropical 
areas have higher disease burdens as diseases such as malaria are primarily associated 
with these regions. Moreover, Gallup et al. (1999) highlight the role of geography in 
determining trade by arguing that landlocked economies face higher transportation costs. 
Landlocked countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, are impeded due to the 
distance from markets and the relatively lower levels of transportation infrastructure in 
the region. 
Some other authors (Collier, 1998; Udry, 1998), however, are not as convinced by 
the determinant role for geography as outlined above. Udry (1998) disagrees that 
geography is the primary impediment to Africa’s growth noting that market failure must   12
play a central role in any explanation. Further, he claims that, to a certain extent, 
geography is endogenous. For instance, the low agricultural productivity and the lack of a 
“true” Green Revolution are not solely the result of disadvantageous geography, but 
rather a combination of geography with “systemic failures of insurance and capital 
markets.” Additionally, while acknowledging the importance of technology, Udry (1998) 
maintains that Bloom and Sachs (1998) have overemphasized the point. 
A second strand of the literature argues for the importance of integration into the 
world economy and of openness to trade. Using a mixture of historical review, case 
studies and econometric analysis, Sachs and Warner (1995), Dollar (1992) and Srinivasan 
and Bhagwati (1999) argue that for a variety of reasons, both direct and indirect, 
openness to trade may result in higher growth. For instance, it can lead to increased 
competition, greater specialization in markets and reduced rent-seeking. Furthermore, as 
countries become more open, the pressure of international competition results in the 
government taking further and complementary reforms. 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), however, criticize much of this literature on 
methodological grounds arguing that the openness variables are improperly measured. 
Likewise, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) maintain that the extent of the openness to trade 
may be partially determined by other factors such as country size. Further, when 
controlling for other factors such as geography and institutions, Rodrik et al., (2004) find 
that trade does not have a direct effect on per capita GDP. Moreover, while openness to 
trade and institutions impact one another, quantitatively, institutions have a stronger 
effect on trade than vice versa.  
Institutions have also been advanced as a major determinant for growth. North 
(1990) argues for the importance of institutions and of the protection of property rights in 
particular. Advocates note the role of property rights and the rule of law in investments in 
physical and human capital as well as in the allocation of resources to their most efficient 
uses (Acemoglu et al., forthcoming). This view also encompasses questions such as 
whether colonial legacies have lasting effects through, for instance, their legal heritage 
(La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, and 1999). More recently, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that   13
colonial institutions shape current institutions particularly with respect to property rights 
and constraints on the executive. In other words, institutions have a long-term impact on 
development. Taken to its extreme, growth is path-dependent upon institutions.  
Fukuyama (2006) argues that (formal) institutions have a less central role than is 
currently assumed in the literature and that institutions do not necessarily result in path 
dependencies for development. In particular, he differentiates between formal and 
informal institutions. Formal institutions are embedded within informal institutions, 
norms and traditions which determine their effectiveness. He notes that leadership plays 
an important role in determining country outcomes by transcending institutional 
frameworks. This view is supported by the empirical work of Jones and Olken (2005b). 
While the death of a political leader leads to changes in growth rates, this occurs only in 
autocratic as opposed to democratic regimes. Moreover, this effect increases as the 
autocratic leaders have fewer constraints on their power. 
In addition to the three broad categories, political and social stability have also 
been argued to be necessary pre-conditions for economic growth. Although examples of 
instability and conflict holding back or reversing economic growth and development exist 
across the world (for example, Afghanistan, Colombia, Liberia, Lebanon, and Haiti), it is 
pandemic in certain regions. Miguel et al. (2004) note that in the 1980s and 1990s, 29 of 
the 43 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had episodes of civil conflict. In turn, Fosu (2002) 
finds a link between political instability (different types of coups) and economic growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, while Murdoch and Sandler (2002) and Collier (1999) establish 
the strong negative impact of civil wars on economic growth. Additionally, research has 
linked agricultural productivity and the effectiveness of public investment, two key 
determinants of development, to the levels of conflict and security (Fulginiti et al., 2004; 
Zhang, 2004).  
While the list can be expanded as a result of a more exhaustive review, no clear 
consensus has emerged as to which factor is the key to economic growth. Adelman 
(2001) argues that the search for “silver bullets” strategies that work in all countries is 
futile. Rather, individual countries face different and often specific constraints. The   14
possibility that different stages of development may have different drivers of growth and 
constraints is another reason to doubt the existence of “silver bullets”.  For example, 
Adelman and Morris (1967) show that different development stages face different 
constraints and challenges. Wan (2004) further argue that the underlying growth 
mechanisms differ across stages of development. Similarly, Galor et al. (2003)  propose a 
model where land abundance is beneficial at early stages of development but later 
becomes an impediment for further development. 
While the above literature helps to identify key determinants of growth, there is 
also a large body of literature emphasizing the important role of coordination among 
different factors in preventing growth failures. In the development process, crises are 
often the result of coordination failures among sectors, agents, regions, or policies. For 
instance, Bardhan (1984) analyses the coordination failure among various parties in India 
which resulted in their inability to bear the short run costs inherent of long-run reforms.  
For rural development in particular, Kydd and Dorward (2003) stress the importance of 
coordination among different economic actors in addressing problems in rural areas.  
Ades and Chua (1997) emphasize the negative impact of regional instability on 
growth. They further note that policies which resolve territorial disputes may have large 
beneficial effects for other countries not directly involved in the dispute. In other words, 
there exist strong spatial effects from instability. Even if the domestic policies are well 
chosen and appropriate, having the misfortune to be located in a region with conflict 
greatly reduces the chances for growth.  
Kremer (1993) perhaps best illustrates this idea using the analogy of the space 
shuttle  Challenger which exploded due to the failure of one of its thousands of 
components, the o-ring. Using the joint production of skilled and unskilled labors as an 
example, he shows that total productivity depends upon the performance of each 
individual. While he considers production functions, this may also be applied to growth 
more generally. Similar to a space shuttle, economic growth may depend on many 
different factors working in tandem.    15
This brief review of the coordination failure literature suggests that growth is an 
outcome of the coordination of many factors, including those well argued in the growth 
literature as shown in the above section. Therefore, we tend to observe that the successful 
stories share similar features which consist of a few core factors. However, deficiencies 
in a larger set of factors may prevent growth and even cause economic collapse. For 
example, while institutions may play a critical in economic growth, they cannot function 
properly under certain conditions (political instability, civil conflict, poor leadership, 
etc.). Therefore, we draw the following hypothesis to test: 
Hypothesis I: There exist asymmetries in the growth process. Upwards and 
downwards movement have different correlates.   
Recent research has found asymmetric determinants of growth. Hausman et al. 
(2005) were the first to follow Pritchett’s injunction (2000) to look at growth episodes. 
The authors find that accelerations are generally correlated with increases in investment 
and trade, real exchange rate depreciations, and political-regime changes. They  find, 
however, different determinants for unsustained and sustained growth accelerations. 
While external shocks produced unsustained growth accelerations, economic reform 
seemed to lead to more sustained growth episodes. Despite the significance of several 
predictors, the authors conclude that growth episodes are highly unpredictable. For 
instance, most political changes and economic reforms do not lead to growth 
accelerations and most growth accelerations occur without any political changes or 
economic reforms. This may be because the accelerations are the result of small 
incremental changes which are not captured by the variables (Rodrik, 2004). 
Expanding the focus from just growth accelerations, Jones and Olken (2005a) 
look at both growth accelerations and decelerations. Using structural break theory to 
identify growth transitions, the authors find different determinants for the growth 
episodes. Growth accelerations were caused by increases in productivity. In turn, these 
seem to be the result of the re-allocation of labor across sectors. Accelerations are also 
linked with growth in trade. Conversely, growth decelerations are due to changes in 
investment, increased monetary instability and sometimes internal conflict. While   16
Hausman et al. (2005) and Jones and Olken (2005a) differ in some specific determinants, 
they coincide with regards to the asymmetries in the growth process. 
Since growth episodes are often not sustained, it is important to look at growth 
dynamics over longer periods of time. However, previous research has tended to focus on 
a window of several years. In this paper, we will draw variables based on the above 
literature review and make use of the exogenously determined income categories in the 
World Development Reports to examine growth dynamics over a long time horizon.
3 We 
test for the existence of asymmetries using a logistic model and compare the results of 
growth and decline episodes.
4 Differing sets of correlates for the growth and decline 
episodes will provide evidence of growth asymmetries.
5 If growth collapses occur for a 
wide range of reasons, econometrically, it would be more difficult to pinpoint the exact 
correlates or causes of collapses than for successful episodes. Due to the difficulties in 
testing this directly, we look for indirect evidence which supports the second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis II:  For a small set of factors, models for the episodes of economic 
growth should perform better than for those of declines.  
Our methodological approach is similar to that Hausman et al. (2005) who use a 
probit to look at the drivers of growth episodes.
6 Jones and Olken’s (2005a) approach is 
based upon the standard neoclassical production function. While this approach has 
merits, since we follow Rodrik et al. (2004) in looking at the so-called “deep” 
determinants and since Jones and Olken (2005a) look at physical and human capital 
accumulation, we do not use this approach.  
 
                                                 
3 The number of variables is also limited due to difficulties in obtaining cross-country data for the base 
year, 1981 and to the limited number of observations in our sample. 
4 Pritchett (2000) outlines the main reasons for not using average growth rates or similar approaches to look 
at growth.  
5 Since we are unable to show causality, the paper only refers to correlates as opposed to drivers of growth. 
Despite this inability, the results are quite suggestive as the levels are from 1981 and are correlated with the 
growth performance over the subsequent 22 year period. 
6 The results presented are essentially unchanged if a probit model is used.   17
III.  SOURCES OF DATA 
Economic growth and decline is measured using movement across the income 
categories in the World Development Reports (WDR). Countries are classified as having 
growth if they are in a higher income category in the 2004 WDR as opposed to the 1983 
WDR. By looking at movement across the 22 year period, we are able to capture growth 
patterns over a fairly long period and to ignore shorter unsustained episodes of growth 
and deceleration. 
The 1983 WDR is chosen since it is the first WDR to use the now standard 
classification of low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income albeit with two 
additional categories (high-income oil exporters and East European non-market 
economies) which we reclassify into the four categories based upon per capita Gross 
National Income (GNI) levels.
7 In total, the 1983 WDR contains information on 125 
countries with populations of more than 1 million and, in a technical appendix, summary 
information on a further 34 less populous countries. 
Measuring growth in this manner has several advantages and disadvantages. One 
major advantage is that we do not define growth episodes ourselves. Since the categories 
were determined by the World Bank in 1983, they reflect the beliefs that were current at 
the time. Current attempts to reclassify countries upon criteria may be influenced, 
consciously or otherwise, by biases such as the knowledge of the actual growth 
experiences of the countries. 
The primary disadvantage of using income categories is that country movement 
within categories may be lost. Despite having the same growth rate, countries in the 
middle of an income group are less likely to change categories than those closer to the 
boundaries of the category. In spite of these shortcomings, looking at the movement 
across categories reveals useful information.  
                                                 
7 To be precise, the 1983 WDR has low income, lower-middle, and upper-middle income and industrial 
market economies categories. In the paper, the last category is assumed to represent high income.   18
Table 1 shows the average, maximum and minimum growth rates by income 
category and by type of movement.
8 In general, the averages broadly confirm what is 
expected. Countries which move up have higher average growth rates than those which 
move down. Furthermore, higher income groups have higher growth rates. The concern 
expressed above is visible in the Min and Max columns as some countries experience 
high rates of GNI per capita change but do not move across income categories. Table 2 
lists the countries with the highest and lowest growth averages by income group and 
movement category. The rank column shows the distance from the country with the 
highest GNI per capita in the income category in 1983 with higher scores indicating 
closer proximity to the top. Some countries, such as Syria, experience decelerations but 
do not change income categories. Syria began at the top of the income category in 1983 
and moved down within the category. While we recognize the loss of information 
regarding movement within but not across income groups, this will be inherent of any 
criteria using movement across groups. We try to address this by adding a variable 
reflecting the relative position of the country within the income category in the 
subsequent regression analyses.  
Due to the size of domestic markets, infrastructure costs and other factors, smaller 
countries may face different constraints and opportunities than larger countries.
9  Based 
upon this, three samples are created. The first sample is limited to the countries in the 
WDR tables, that is countries with populations of 1 million or more. Since the cutoff 
point is arbitrary, countries with populations of 0.9 million are added to create a second 
sample. The third sample contains all of the countries in the WDR and the technical 
appendix. Because of data constraints, a number of countries are subsequently dropped. 
The three resultant samples have 108, 110 and 120 countries respectively (a list of the 
countries by sample can be found in Appendix I). 
                                                 
8 Since countries in the low income category cannot move down, no values are reported, the same for 
countries in the high income category and “move up”. Since data is missing for a number of countries, this 
data is only suggestive. For instance, there was no data available for the two countries in the high income 
category which move down. The total number of countries used to generate these numbers is listed in the 
“total” column. The data is drawn from the 2004 World Development Indicators. 
9  For example, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) for country size , openness and trade.   19
Table 1.  Summary Growth Statistics for Gross National Income per Capita by 
Income Category and Movement, 1981-2002 
   Average Growth  Min  Max  # of Countries 
All  LI 8.5  -81.1  336.4  24 
   LMI  26.7  -61.5  189.0  33 
   UMI  95.6  -44.3  422.6  22 
   HI  93.2  -52.7  217.6  19 
Do not move  LI -13.9  -81.1  62.1 22 
   LMI  47.4  -37.6  189.0  19 
   UMI  50.4  -44.3  141.6  10 
   HI  101.3  -22.8  217.6  18 
Move up  LI 255.3  174.2  336.4  2 
   LMI  149.0  123.0  175.0  2 
   UMI  232.9  112.0  422.6  7 
    HI  - -  - - 
Move down  LI  - -  - - 
   LMI  -26.6  -61.5  24.6  12 
   UMI  -6.1  -29.5  36.1  5 
   HI  -52.7  -52.7  -52.7  1 
 
Table 2.  Countries with Lowest and Highest Growth Rates of Gross National 
Income per Capita by Category, 1981-2002 
   Average Growth  Group  Rank  % Change 
Do not move  Min -  LI  -  - 
   Max  India  LI  43.9  62.1 
   Min  Syrian Arab Repub.  LMI  94.0  -37.6 
   Max  El Salvador  LMI  28.0  189.0 
   Min  Gabon  UMI  75.0  -44.3 
   Max  Hungary  UMI  25.0  141.6 
   Min  Canada  HI  38.5  88.6 
   Max  -  HI  -  - 
Move up  Min Sri  Lanka  LI  61.0  174.2 
   Max  China  LI  53.7  336.4 
   Min  Botswana  LMI  60.0  123.0 
   Max  Costa Rica  LMI  86.0  175.0 
   Min  Greece  UMI  78.1  112.0 
   Max  Korea, Repub  UMI  0.0  422.6 
Move down  Min Nigeria  LMI  50.0  -61.5 
   Max  Indonesia  LMI  10.0  24.6 
   Min  Iran  UMI  3.1  -29.5 
   Max  Brazil  UMI  31.3  36.1 
   Min  Saudi Arabia  HI  -52.7  -52.7 
   Max  Saudi Arabia  HI  -52.7  -52.7 
   20
Within each sample, two different sub-samples are created. One sub-sample 
consists of countries which move up or could have moved up, that is countries which are 
not in the high income category. Since there is no further group above the high income 
category, these countries are omitted from the comparison group for the Up sample. 
Similarly, the second sub-sample consists of countries which move down or which could 
have moved down.  Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the countries changing 
categories. Table 4 lists those countries by group. 
Table 3.  Movement Across Income Categories, by Samples 
   Position of and Movement of Countries between 1983 and 2004 – Sample 1 
   Position in 2004 WDR    
Position in 1983 WDR  LI LMI UMI HI Total
Low Income                    (LI) 29 2 0 0  31
Lower-Middle Income   (LMI) 15 19 1 0  35
Upper-Middle Income   (UMI) 0 5 9 7  21
High Income                   (HI) 0 0 2 19  21
Up - 2 1   7  10
Down 15 5 2 -  22
Total 44 26 12 25  108
 
   Position of and Movement of Countries between 1983 and 2004 – Sample 2 
   Position in 2004 WDR    
Position in 1983 WDR  LI LMI UMI HI Total
Low Income                    (LI) 29 2 0 0  31
Lower-Middle Income   (LMI) 15 19 3 0  37
Upper-Middle Income   (UMI) 05 97   2 1
High Income                   (HI) 0 0 2 19  21
Up  - 2 3   7  10
Down 15 5 2 -  22
Total 44 26 14 25  110
 
   Position of and Movement of Countries between 1983 and 2004 – Sample 3 
   Position in 2004 WDR    
Position in 1983 WDR  LI LMI UMI HI Total
Low Income                    (LI) 33 2 0 0  35
Lower-Middle Income   (LMI) 15 21 3 0  39
Upper-Middle Income   (UMI) 0 6 10 8  24
High Income                   (HI) 0 0 2 20  22
Up  - 2 3   8  13
Down 15 6 2 -  23
Total 48 29 15 28  120
   21
Table 4.  Countries Moving Across Income Categories 
Low Income  Lower-Middle  
Income 
Upper-Middle Income  High Income 
Up Down  Up  Down  Up Down  Up  Down 
China    Botswana Angola  Cyprus  Algeria      Libya 
Sri Lanka    Costa Rica  Cameroon  Greece  Brazil     Saudi Arabia
   Mauritius Congo,  Rep.  Ireland  Fiji    
     Indonesia  Israel  Iran       
     Ivory Coast  Korea, Rep. Romania       
     Kenya  Portugal  S.h Africa       
     Lesotho  Singapore          
     Mauritania  Spain          
     Mongolia             
     Nicaragua             




Guinea             
     Senegal             
     Zambia             
     Zimbabwe             
 
Regardless of the sample, between the two periods, roughly 30% of the countries 
change income categories.  In general, countries moved away from middle-income status 
as countries in the lower-middle income group moved downwards while those in the 
upper-middle group moved upwards.  As a result, the share of the middle income 
countries fell from approximately 50 percent to close to 35 percent.  In the high income 
group, only two countries, Libya and Saudi Arabia, moved downward and an additional 
two low income countries, China and Sri Lanka, moved up to lower-middle income 
status. 
Tropics and the percent of land within 100 kilometers of the coast are used to 
measure geography.  Tropical countries are expected to be both in lower income 
categories and to have lower growth.  Countries are classified as tropical if the absolute 
value of their latitude is less than or equal to 23.  This variable is drawn from Global 
Development Network Growth database at the New York University Development 
Research Institute.  Proximity to the coast is important for both agro-ecological reasons   22
and the lowering of transportation costs and consequent increasing of the potential for 
trade.
10  The data is drawn from the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network at Columbia.  
Based upon the literature review, we choose generally accepted proxies for each 
of the “deep” determinants and for the shocks and stage of development: stage of 
development (initial income group, proximity to highest income level in income group), 
geography (tropical, percent of land within 100 kilometers of coast), trade (average 
trade/GDP ratio for 1981-1985).  While other proxies exist, the choice and number of 
variable is constrained by the number of observations and the availability of cross-
country data for 1981. 
A variable for the constraints on the executive branch will be used to proxy for 
institutional effects.  Since the 1983 WDR is based upon data from 1981, this year is also 
used for this variable.  The variable is drawn from the Polity IV dataset with values of -
66, -77, and -88 recoded in the same manner as Polity IV recodes the polity2 variable.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) suggests that the more constraints on the executive, the higher the 
growth. 
While the literature debates the importance of openness to trade, the actual effects 
of trade may be just as important.  Regardless of their openness to trade, certain 
countries, for reasons such as country size or remoteness, will always have low levels of 
trade.  Furthermore, using actual levels of trade measures the importance that trade does 
have as opposed to that which trade could have.  For these reasons and due to data 
constraints and methodological issues in measuring openness to trade (inter alia Rodrik 
and Rodriguez, 2001), we use actual levels of trade.
11 
                                                 
10 For a small number of countries, such as Ethiopia, the percent of land within 100 kilometers of the coast 
changes over time. Due to the lack of alternative data and to the extreme rareness of this occurrence, this 
possibility is consciously ignored.  
11 Due to the limited sample size, we do not present the results measuring openness to trade using Lee’s 
(1993) composite measure of tariff restrictions in the 1980s. While the limited sample size makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions, the results are broadly consistent with asymmetric correlates of growth. A 
different approach would be to use gravity-equation trade model (Frankel and Romer, 1999). The lack of 
pair-wise trade data for 1981 prevents us from using this variable in this paper.   23
The actual effects of trade are measured using the average ratio of trade to GDP 
between 1981 and 1985.
12  The data is drawn from the Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT).  
Where possible, missing data is filled using the World Development Indicators 2004 
(WDI).  While the PWT and the WDI data are not identical, the differences are generally 
quite small and the WDI data is used only for a handful of cases. 
Variables for the stage of development are also created using the initial income 
categories as a proxy.  Additionally, a variable is created reflecting the proximity of the 
country to the country with the highest income in the income category.
13  As countries are 
closer to the threshold to the next highest income level, the variable takes a higher value.  
The variable reflects the intuition that countries which are closer to the threshold between 
income categories are more likely to change categories than those which are further 
away.  
In order to better understand the effects of shocks on the development process, a 
variable for the number of internal conflicts between 1981 and 2002 is also created.  The 
Armed Conflict database from the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International 
Peace Research Institute can be separated, among other ways, by location and by 
intensity.
14  The intensity reflects the number of deaths as the result of politically 
motivated violence.  As Miguel et al. (2004) argue, the higher threshold may exclude 
events which are significant in smaller countries.  Further, the lower threshold may better 
capture domestic instability which adversely affects economic development through the 
effectiveness of investments or other factors.  Consequently, we use the lowest intensity 
threshold and only look at internal conflicts.
15 
                                                 
12 We use the average trade/GDP ratio from the early period of 1981 to 1985 to partly reduce the potential 
endogeneity problem as the growth is measured in a longer and later period of 1983-2004. Therefore the 
causality from growth on trade is minimized.  
13 The per capita GNI is missing for some of the countries in the 1983 WDR. When these countries can be 
situated relative to other countries, they are included in the sample and their income is assumed to be the 
average of the country immediately above and below them. Countries can be situated when the country 
immediately above and below them have non-missing GNI values. 
14 Location: within country or not; intensity: (1) more than 25 deaths in year; (2) more than 25 deaths in 
year and more than 1,000 deaths total conflict history; (3) more than 1,000 deaths in year. 
15 The significance of the conflict variable depends on the threshold used.  When the lowest threshold is 
used (25 deaths per year and any number of cumulative deaths), then the variable is significant. The other   24
A potential problem of this threshold is that events such as the Omagh bombing 
by the Real IRA in 1999 which killed 28 people are sufficient to result in a year being 
counted as having conflict.  The Armed Conflict database does not provide information 
on the total number of deaths apart from the 25 and 1,000 death thresholds.  While the 
Correlates of War (COW) database does provide information on the number of deaths, 
there is only one observation per conflict and it therefore does not provide a measure of 
intensity by year.  Furthermore, Sambanis’ (2002) detailed critique of the COW data 
leads us to not use it to test the robustness of the results. 
Table 5 compares the means of the variables used in the regression analysis for 
countries moving up and down.  The results show systematic differences between the two 
sub-samples for many variables.  The percentage of land within 100 kilometer from the 
coast for the Up group is high at 75.6 as compared to the 19.3 for the Down group.  
Constraints on executive in 1981 are significantly higher for countries moving up.  While 
the comparison provides a basic idea of the difference between the groups, a more 
rigorous multivariate analysis is needed to quantify the impact of each individual factor 
on the growth dynamics.  
Table 5.  Variable Means by Movement Category 
Variable  Move Down  Move Up  P Value 
Low-middle income (0,1)            0.65     0.15  0.003 
Upper-middle income (0,1)  0.26     0.69  0.011 
Proximity to next group  34.23  67.87  0.000 
Tropical (0,1)  0.65     0.38  0.128 
% land <100 km from coast  19.25  75.62  0.000 
Avg Trade/GDP, 1981-85  69.69  99.17  0.150 
Constraint on Executive, 1981  2.98    5.54  0.001 
# years of conflict, 1981-2002  5.09    3.92  0.635 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
thresholds result in the variable being insignificant more often than not with varying p-values. The location 
of the conflict does not affect the significance of the variable in any of the logistics. The odds-ratios and 
level of significance of the other variables are broadly unchanged regardless of the specification.    25
IV.  ESTIMATION OF GROWTH DYNAMICS 
Using the variables outlined in the previous section, we estimate a logistic model 
with robust estimators.  The results are presented in Table 6 where rows 1-3 show the 
odds ratio for the Up model while rows 4-6 show the same for the Down sample.  Rows 1 
and 4 use the first sample (population of at least 1 million), rows 2 and 5 use the second 
sample (population of at least 0.9 million), while rows 3 and 6 use the third sample (all 
countries).  Since the first sample is more than ten percent smaller than the third sample, 
the different samples provide a check on the robustness of the results. 
Table 6.  Logistic Model for Movement Upwards and Downwards, by Sub-Sample 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Up Up Up Down  Down  Down 
Lower-middle  inc  0.000**  0.019**  0.186 1.765 1.415 1.404 
    (2.39) (2.05) (1.23) (0.39) (0.25) (0.25) 
Upper-middle  inc 0.000**  0.037 0.283 1.233 1.140 1.720 
    (2.31) (1.64) (0.88) (0.15) (0.09) (0.43) 
Proximity next group  1.068**  1.016  1.011  0.964**  0.965***  0.964*** 
    (1.99  (1.13  (1.00) (2.53) (2.81) (2.96) 
Tropical 0.000***  0.026*  0.032**  4.185  3.493  3.489 
    (2.91) (1.81) (2.14) (1.51) (1.38) (1.57) 
% land <100km  1.125***  1.033  1.031  0.948***  0.953***  0.954*** 
    (3.02) (1.22) (1.23) (3.74) (3.74) (3.96) 
Trade/GDP  1.066  1.034*** 1.018*** 1.015*** 1.012**  1.008 
    (1.60) (2.90) (2.93) (2.84) (2.43) (1.28) 
Constraints on exec  3.953***  2.169***  1.916***  0.806  0.775  0.905 
    (3.52) (3.59) (3.59) (0.91) (1.06) (0.51) 
# of Conflicts  0.710*  0.885  0.956  1.074  1.082*  1.087* 
    (1.90) (1.43) (0.48) (1.47) (1.70) (1.70) 
Observations  87 89 98 77 79 85 
Pseudo  R²  0.747 0.572 0.551 0.460 0.441 0.354 
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses; 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   26
In general, the models fit reasonably well with relatively higher pseudo R²s for 
the Up sub-samples (0.55-0.75) than for the Down sub-samples (0.35-0.46).  As a 
comparison, our model, which examines a longer period of time, has better predictive 
power in explaining the country dynamics than Hausman et al. (2005).  In their probit 
models, the pseudo R² values remain low (between 0.05 and 0.08).  Consequently, they 
note that the models do a relatively poor job of predicting accelerations and argue that 
“growth accelerations are caused predominately by idiosyncratic, and often small-scale, 
changes” which presumably cannot be captured by the model or by the variables.  By 
improving the pseudo R²s to between 0.37-0.75, we show that, to a certain extent, models 
are able to predict movement across income groups over longer periods of time. 
There are several reasons why the Up model performs better than the Down 
model.  For instance, the variables which are correlated with movement downwards may 
simply not have been selected for the model.  Our framework presents an alternative 
explanation: while a relatively small number of “deep” determinants are related to 
upwards movement, a failure in some small set of a large number of areas 
(macroeconomic, political and social stability, weather, policy, etc.) may lead to 
downwards movement.  This remains a topic for future research since our model does not 
allow for this to be empirically verified.  
The relatively high fit of the model is worth underlining since it uses only fixed 
factors or variables for the early 1980s.  This result is similar to the findings of Temple 
and Johnson (1998) who find that the social capability index of Adelman and Morris 
(1967) and its constituent parts predict subsequent growth performances.  Likewise, 
while the values of the variables in the model – as well as many other policies and 
factors– change over the 22 year period, the measures from 1981 are nonetheless highly 
correlated with subsequent movement. 
Despite the varying samples, the coefficients and significance of variables are 
relatively constant.  Within the Up sub-samples, tropics and constraints of the executive 
are consistently highly significant with fairly stable coefficients while trade is significant 
at the 1% level in two of three of the samples with similar coefficients.  Variables for the   27
stage of development are also significant in samples excluding smaller countries.  Within 
the Down sub-samples, the number of significant variables is lower.  The percent of land 
within 100 kilometers of the coast and the initial starting position of a country are 
consistently significant.  Trade is also significant in samples of larger countries (samples 
1 and 2).  Likewise, conflict appears to increase the likelihood of moving down income 
categories. 
The geographic variable of land within 100 kilometers of the coast is consistently 
negatively correlated (and with almost identical odds-ratios) with downwards mobility 
and is at times positively correlated with movement upwards.  This likely reflects the 
ability of countries to participate in the increasingly global trade.  Countries without 
access to the coast and which are far from major trading areas face potentially high 
infrastructure costs and may be constrained by the inability of neighbors to provide 
adequate infrastructure. 
Countries with domestic instability and violence were more likely to move 
downwards and, to lesser extent, less prone to move upwards.  Each additional year of 
instability, decreases the likelihood of moving up by 5-20 percent and increases that of 
moving downwards by roughly 7 to 9 percent.  The results suggest that stability is a key 
pre-condition for long-term growth and that instability may be closely related to 
economic collapses.  While not correlated with downwards movement, constraints on the 
executive strongly increase the probability of moving up income categories.  
The results confirm the existence of asymmetries in the growth process of a broad 
cross section of countries across a sustained period of time.  These findings corroborate 
those of Jones and Olken (2005a) and, to a lesser extent, those of Hausman et al. (2005). 
We find not only that the coefficients of variables vary between the Up and Down 
sample, but also that different variables are significant thereby confirming hypothesis I 
Further, the ratio of trade to GDP is generally significantly correlated with positive 
movement in either direction.  This has strong consequences for growth literature which 
assumes that variables have the same impact regardless of the direction of movement.  As 
a result of the asymmetry, much of this work may be misleading and may therefore need   28
to be revisited.  Beyond looking at average growth rates, incidents of acceleration and 
deceleration may need to be considered separately. 
As previously noted, the differing samples of countries provide a measure of the 
robustness of the results.  In general, as evidenced in Table 6, the results are very 
comparable especially for the main results.  There are clear asymmetries between the Up 
and Down sub-samples regardless of the set of countries used.  Further, the Up model 
consistently outperforms the Down model.  While the significance of some variables 
changes based upon the sample, most variables are significant in at least two of three 
samples and the coefficients are relatively stable. 
In order to further test the robustness, we use a varying coefficients model with 
two groups: countries with negative GNI per capita growth rates over the period and 
those with positive rates.  The varying coefficient model essentially adds interaction 
terms between the two groups and each of the independent variables.  The results 
reported in Table 7 show the total effect (the variable plus the interaction term) of each 
independent variable for each group, (1) for countries moving down and (2) for countries 
moving up.  The standard errors are adjusted to reflect the total effect.  The results largely 
support those from the logistic model.  The coefficients from the up model strongly differ 
from those in the down model providing further clear evidence of asymmetries.   
Additionally, compared with the countries moving down, more of the variables for the 
countries moving up are significant.  While this does not show that the second hypothesis 
is true, it is suggestive of it. 
The different specifications support the two principle findings of the paper: the 
asymmetry in the correlates of growth and the greater predictive power of the Up model.  
The former implies that the underlying determinants of growth and declines may be 
different.  Successful counties may share similar characteristics, while economic 
collapses, however, may result from a wider range of problems.  In some sense, every 
economic decline is a unique story. 
   29
Table 7.  Varying Coefficient Model for Percent Growth GNI per Capita, 1981-2002 
   (1)  (2) 
   Down  Up 
Log 1981 GNI per cap  -0.772  -20.322** 
   (0.08)  (2.03) 
Tropical 1.126  -52.697*** 
   (0.04)  (2.69) 
% land <100km  0.018  0.568** 
   (0.04)  (2.31) 
Trade/GDP 0.127  0.399** 
   (0.36)  (2.21) 
Constraints on exec  0.950  9.350** 
   (0.17)  (2.01) 
Conflict 0.346  -1.184** 
   (0.16)  ((2.14) 
Constant -229.615**  190.575*** 
   (2.14)  (2.66) 
Observations 98  
R²  0.612  
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** stands for significant at 10%; ** 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
By looking at country dynamics across income categories, as defined in the World 
Development Reports (WDR), over a significant period of time, we find clear evidence of 
growth asymmetry.  Factors correlated with movement upwards or downwards tend to 
differ.  Our literature review and framework suggests that in part, this may be because 
countries which experience growth share several common features.  Conversely, a great 
number of problems may lead to economic collapse (“weakest link”).  In some sense, the 
framework suggests that long run growth is like marriage.  Successful marriages share a 
small set of similar qualities but marriages may fail for a wide variety of reasons. 
The core findings regarding asymmetry suggest, with serious implications for the 
growth literature, that a single equation cannot be used to explain economic growth and 
decline.  In general, research has tended to examine success stories to understand why 
they are successful.  Our findings suggest that more research is needed to identify better 
correlates or determinants of economic decline.  In practical terms, economic policies 
which prevent economic collapse may not lead to economic growth.  Consequently, when 
governments are constrained policies which avoid economic collapse, such as through 
conditionality, they may also be constrained to avoid great economic growth.   
Alternately, while these plans may provide the basis for economic growth (by “getting 
the fundamentals right”), they may only provide the platform; further policies may be 
needed to launch the growth.  
While a narrow set of “deep” determinant variables may be associated with 
growth, one should be cautious that this does not necessarily imply similar policies for all 
countries.  Many countries have tried to copy the policies of successful countries and 
have subsequently learned that policy is not necessarily transferable.  Rather, these 
drivers of growth must be adapted to local conditions and the “right” policy in one 
country may not resemble that in another country.  For instance, China has had 
tremendous economic success despite not following traditional policy recommendations.  
Few, however, would suggest that China’s strategy is applicable to most countries.   31
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APPENDIX I.  SAMPLE MEMBERSHIP 
Sample 1 
Algeria   Denmark   Japan   Pakistan   Trinidad and Tobago  
Angola   Domincan Repub  Jordan   Panama   Tunisia  
Argentina   Ecuador   Kenya   Papua New Guinea   Turkey  
Australia   Egypt   Korea, Repub  Paraguay   Uganda  
Austria   El Salvador   Kuwait   Peru   United Arab Emirates  
Bangladesh   Ethiopia   Lao  Philippines   United Kingdom  
Belgium   Finland   Lesotho   Portugal   United States  
Benin   France   Libya   Romania   Uruguay  
Bhutan   German, Fed Repub.  Madagascar   Rwanda   Venezuela  
Bolivia   Ghana   Malawi   Saudi Arabia   Zaire  
Brazil   Greece   Malaysia   Senegal   Zambia  
Burkina Faso   Guatemala   Mali   Sierra Leone   Zimbabwe  
Burma   Guinea   Mauritania   Singapore     
Burundi   Haiti   Mexico   Somalia     
Cameroon   Honduras   Mongolia   South Africa     
Canada   Hungary   Morocco   Spain     
CAR  India   Mozambique   Sri Lanka     
Chad   Indonesia   Nepal   Sudan     
Chile   Iran   Netherlands   Sweden     
China   Ireland   New Zealand   Switzerland     
Columbia   Israel   Nicaragua   Syrian Arab Repub.    
Congo, Repub  Italy   Niger   Tanzania     
Costa Rica   Ivory Coast   Nigeria   Thailand     
Cuba   Jamaica   Norway   Togo     
              
Sample 2 
Algeria   Denmark   Japan   Pakistan   Trinidad and Tobago  
Angola   Domincan Repub  Jordan   Panama   Tunisia  
Argentina   Ecuador   Kenya   Papua New Guinea   Turkey  
Australia   Egypt   Korea, Repub  Paraguay   Uganda  
Austria   El Salvador   Kuwait   Peru   United Arab Emirates  
Bangladesh   Ethiopia   Lao  Philippines   United Kingdom  
Belgium   Finland   Lesotho   Portugal   United States  
Benin   France   Libya   Romania   Uruguay  
Bhutan   German, Fed Repub.  Madagascar   Rwanda   Venezuela  
Bolivia   Ghana   Malawi   Saudi Arabia   Zaire  
Brazil   Greece   Malaysia   Senegal   Zambia  
Burkina Faso   Guatemala   Mali   Sierra Leone   Zimbabwe  
Burma   Guinea   Mauritania   Singapore   Botswana  
Burundi   Haiti   Mexico   Somalia   Mauritius  
Cameroon   Honduras   Mongolia   South Africa     
Canada   Hungary   Morocco   Spain       36
CAR  India   Mozambique   Sri Lanka     
Chad   Indonesia   Nepal   Sudan     
Chile   Iran   Netherlands   Sweden     
China   Ireland   New Zealand   Switzerland     
Columbia   Israel   Nicaragua   Syrian Arab Repub.    
Congo, Repub  Italy   Niger   Tanzania     
Costa Rica   Ivory Coast   Nigeria   Thailand     
Cuba   Jamaica   Norway   Togo     
              
Sample 3 
Algeria   Denmark   Japan   Pakistan   Trinidad and Tobago  
Angola   Domincan Repub  Jordan   Panama   Tunisia  
Argentina   Ecuador   Kenya   Papua New Guinea   Turkey  
Australia   Egypt   Korea, Repub  Paraguay   Uganda  
Austria   El Salvador   Kuwait   Peru   United Arab Emirates  
Bangladesh   Ethiopia   Lao  Philippines   United Kingdom  
Belgium   Finland   Lesotho   Portugal   United States  
Benin   France   Libya   Romania   Uruguay  
Bhutan   German, Fed Repub.  Madagascar   Rwanda   Venezuela  
Bolivia   Ghana   Malawi   Saudi Arabia   Zaire  
Brazil   Greece   Malaysia   Senegal   Zambia  
Burkina Faso   Guatemala   Mali   Sierra Leone   Zimbabwe  
Burma   Guinea   Mauritania   Singapore   Botswana  
Burundi   Haiti   Mexico   Somalia   Mauritius  
Cameroon   Honduras   Mongolia   South Africa   Bahrain  
Canada   Hungary   Morocco   Spain   Comoros  
CAR  India   Mozambique   Sri Lanka   Cyprus  
Chad   Indonesia   Nepal   Sudan   Equatorial Guinea  
Chile   Iran   Netherlands   Sweden   Fiji  
China   Ireland   New Zealand   Switzerland   Gabon  
Columbia   Israel   Nicaragua   Syrian Arab Repub.  Gambia  
Congo, Repub  Italy   Niger   Tanzania   Guinea-Bissau  
Costa Rica   Ivory Coast   Nigeria   Thailand   Guyana  
Cuba   Jamaica   Norway   Togo   Ireland  
            Swaziland  
Note: Move up in bold          
Move down italicized          
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Bhutan   -  Lower  0  0  59.7  2  0.0  2.4 
Lao -  Lower  1  5  11.5  3  7.3  4.9 
Chad   -  Lower  1  20  35.8  1  0.0  7.3 
Bangladesh   -  Lower  0  12  21.7  2  71.1  9.8 
Ethiopia   -  Lower  1  18  26.8  3  2.1  12.2 
Nepal   -  Lower  0  7  31.2  3  0.0  14.6 
Equatorial Guinea   -  Lower  1  0  100.5  1  63.8  17.1 
Burma   -  Lower  1  22  18.5  2  30.7  22.0 
Mali   -  Lower  1  3  49.2  1  0.0  24.4 
Guinea-Bissau   -  Lower  1  2  53.3  3  85.5  26.8 
Malawi   -  Lower  1  0  53.3  1  0.0  29.3 
Zaire   -  Lower  0  6  39.2  1  0.6  31.7 
Uganda   -  Lower  1  20  27.1  4  0.0  34.1 
Burundi   -  Lower  1  11  33.8  1  0.0  36.6 
Burkina Faso   -  Lower  1  2  42.8  1  0.0  39.0 
Rwanda   -  Lower  1  11  32.5  1  0.0  41.5 
India   -  Lower  0  22  14.1  7  16.7  43.9 
Somalia   -  Lower  1  18  77.0  1  44.1  46.3 
Tanzania   -  Lower  1  0  15.7  3  9.6  48.8 
Guinea   -  Lower  1  2  70.3  1  14.9  56.1 
Haiti   -  Lower  1  2  46.7  1  100.0  58.5 
Benin   -  Lower  1  0  69.0  1  10.7  63.4 
CAR -  Lower  1  2  57.5  1  0.0  65.9 
Sierra Leone   -  Lower  1  10  22.4  3  49.5  68.3 
Comoros   -  Lower  1  2  67.1  3  100.0  70.7 
Madagascar   -  Lower  1  0  31.5  3  57.6  73.2 
Niger   -  Lower  1  4  53.7  1  0.0  75.6 
Pakistan   -  Lower  0  14  33.8  1  11.9  80.5 
Mozambique   -  Lower  1  12  27.2  2  30.4  85.4 
Gambia   -  Lower  1  1  108.3  5  75.7  87.8 
Sudan   -  Lower  1  20  28.4  3  2.9  92.7 
Togo   -  Lower  1  2  102.0  1  16.7  95.1 
Ghana   -  Lower  1  2  14.2  1  19.4  97.6 
Bolivia   -  L-Middle  1  0  49.7  1  0.0  14.0 
Honduras   -  L-Middle  1  0  57.6  5  67.3  16.0 
Egypt   -  L-Middle  0  6  64.6  3  22.8  26.0 
El Salvador   -  L-Middle  1  11  53.7  4  99.5  28.0 
Guyana   -  L-Middle  1  0  120.0  1  26.7  30.0   38
Swaziland   -  L-Middle  0  0  148  1  28.8  34.0 
Thailand   -  L-Middle  1  5  49.2  3  29.0  36.0 
Philippines   -  L-Middle  1  22  48.5  2  100.0  38.0 
Morocco   -  L-Middle  0  9  50.1  2  34.2  46.0 
Cuba   -  L-Middle  1  0  78.5  1  100.0  58.0 
Guatemala   -  L-Middle  1  15  31  3  42.4  66.0 
Peru   -  L-Middle  1  19  37  6  16.9  68.0 
Ecuador   -  L-Middle  1  1  44.7  7  38.9  70.0 
Jamaica   -  L-Middle  1  0  101.4  7  100.0  72.0 
Domincan Repub  -  L-Middle  1  0  47.7  5  99.8  76.0 
Columbia   -  L-Middle  1  22  26.2  6  16.2  82.0 
Tunisia   -  L-Middle  0  0  80  1  48.2  84.0 
Turkey   -  L-Middle  0  19  29.5  1  38.9  90.0 
Syrian Arab Repub.  -  L-Middle  0  2  40.2  1  12.6  94.0 
Jordan   -  L-Middle  0  0  122.6  1  11.6  96.0 
Paraguay   -  L-Middle  0  1  35.9  1  0.0  98.0 
Malaysia   -  U-Middle  1  1  108.1  5  79.3  12.5 
Panama   -  U-Middle  1  1  79.1  2  100.0  15.6 
Hungary   -  U-Middle  0  0  83.8  3  0.0  25.0 
Mexico   -  U-Middle  1  2  31.2  3  38.5  34.4 
Argentina   -  U-Middle  0  1  15.6  1  12.5  43.8 
Chile   -  U-Middle  0  0  46.5  1  69.3  46.9 
Uruguay   -  U-Middle  0  0  42.2  3  37.4  53.1 
Venezuela   -  U-Middle  1  1  42.3  6  25.3  56.3 
Gabon   -  U-Middle  1  0  105.9  1  27.3  75.0 
Trinidad and Tobago   -  U-Middle  1  1  71.8  7  100.0  96.9 
Italy   -  Upper  0  0  45.6  7  78.7  3.8 
New Zealand   -  Upper  0  0  62.4  7  93.5  7.7 
Bahrain   -  Upper  0  0  209.8  1  100.0  15.4 
United Kingdom   -  Upper  0  12  53.3  7  95.3  19.2 
Japan   -  Upper  0  0  26.7  7  96.8  23.1 
Austria   -  Upper  0  0  74.4  7  1.4  26.9 
Finland   -  Upper  0  0  60.1  7  33.0  30.8 
Australia   -  Upper  0  0  32.3  7  21.3  34.6 
Canada   -  Upper  0  0  51.5  7  31.1  38.5 
Netherlands   -  Upper  0  0  112.2  7  85.5  42.3 
Belgium   -  Upper  0  0  137.2  7  48.0  46.2 
France   -  Upper  0  0  45.6  5  34.4  50.0 
United States   -  Upper  0  4  18.2  7  16.9  57.7 
Denmark   -  Upper  0  0  71.2  7  100.0  65.4 
German, Fed Repub.  -  Upper  0  0  56.5  7  21.5  69.2 
Norway   -  Upper  0  0  78.1  7  80.8  73.1 
Sweden   -  Upper  0  0  66.2  7  40.1  76.9 
Switzerland   -  Upper  0  0  71.1  7  0.0  84.6 
Kuwait   -  Upper  0  2  104.9  3  97.2  88.5 
United Arab Emirates   -  Upper  1  0  95.7  3  73.7  92.3 
Kenya   down  L-Middle  1  1  53.8  3  9.1  0.0 
Senegal   down  L-Middle  1  9  79.7  3  31.4  2.0   39
Mauritania   down  L-Middle  1  0  109.1  3  5.7  4.0 
Indonesia   down  L-Middle  1  18  49.2  2  77.2  10.0 
Lesotho   down  L-Middle  0  1  154.3  2  0.0  12.0 
Zambia   down  L-Middle  1  0  68.1  1  0.0  18.0 
Angola   down  L-Middle  1  22  67  3  12.0  40.0 
Papua New Guinea   down  L-Middle  1  7  94.2  7  73.7  42.0 
Nicaragua   down  L-Middle  1  9  47.6  2  61.8  48.0 
Nigeria   down  L-Middle  1  2  35  7  9.3  50.0 
Zimbabwe   down  L-Middle  1  0  41.2  5  0.0  52.0 
Cameroon   down  L-Middle  1  2  64.5  2  10.1  54.0 
Congo, Repub  down  L-Middle  1  6  105.5  2  4.6  64.0 
Ivory Coast   down  L-Middle  1  1  76.5  1  16.9  74.0 
Mongolia   down  L-Middle  0  0  92.8  3  0.0  80.0 
Iran   down  U-Middle  0  17  24.2  2.5  15.7  3.1 
Fiji   down  U-Middle  1  0  92.4  7  52.5  18.8 
Algeria   down  U-Middle  0  12  54.4  1  4.4  28.1 
Brazil   down  U-Middle  1  0  19.3  1  9.6  31.3 
Romania   down  U-Middle  0  1  52.9  2  7.0  40.6 
South Africa   down  U-Middle  0  8  51.8  7  19.1  50.0 
Libya   down  Upper  0  1  86.2  1  10.1  11.5 
Saudi Arabia   down  Upper  0  0  83.2  1  12.7  53.8 
China   up  Lower  0  6  15.8  3  6.3  53.7 
Sri Lanka   up  Lower  1  19  69.2  5  98.5  61.0 
Botswana   up  L-Middle  1  0  104.8  5  0.0  60.0 
Mauritius   up  U-Middle  1  0  100.1  7  99.8  78.0 
Costa Rica   up  L-Middle  1  0  76.6  7  99.8  86.0 
Korea, Repub  up  U-Middle  0  0  69.6  3  92.2  0.0 
Portugal   up  U-Middle  0  0  65.9  6  68.2  37.5 
Cyprus   up  U-Middle  0  0  114.5  7  100.0  71.9 
Greece   up  U-Middle  0  0  48.7  5  95.1  78.1 
Israel   up  U-Middle  0  22  105.9  7  86.4  84.4 
Ireland   up  U-Middle  0  0  105.9  7  94.1  87.5 
Singapore   up  U-Middle  1  0  373.5  3  99.8  90.6 
Spain   up  U-Middle  0  4  38.8  7  43.1  93.8 
Group*           
Overall 0.56  4.8  64.9  3.6  40.2  48.8 
Up 0.38  3.9  99.2  5.5  75.6  67.9 
Could have moved up but did not  0.72  6.0  57.1  2.7  31.3  46.7 
Down 0.65  5.1  69.7  3.0  19.3  34.2 
Could have moved down but did not  0.39  3.0  74.5  4.5  55.7  54.8 
*Averages based upon the third sample             
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